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In Contingency, irony and solidarity, Richard Rorty outlines his conception of the
ideal liberal utopia, wherein moral change results from the substitution ofFreedom for
Truth as "the goal of thinking and of social progress" (xiii). Rorty maintains that
autonomous self-creation and human solidarity are not to be united in a "single vision"
(xiv), but rather. "the closest we will come to joining these two quests is to see the aim of
a just and free society as letting its citizens be as privatistic, 'irrationalist', and aestheticist
as they please so long as they do it on their own time" (xiv). Rorty charges Plato as being
one who endorses the notion that Truth exists. an idealist account which (according to
Rorty) entails beliefs such as the following: there is an essential human nature that might
be defined. there are absolute standards to which we might appeal in order to make correct
moral judgments, and there is an ultimate "final vocabulary" that will accurately describe
'1he way things are". Rorty is a pragmatic relativist who is suspicious ofPlato and other
idealists, and as an unfortunate consequence of this tension, Rorty fails to see that many of
the practical consequences of Plato's philosophy are in fact very similar to those desired
by Rorty himself
As evidenced by his account of justice and a just society in the Republic, Plato
shares many ofRorty's ideas about the most appropriate ways to discuss the concept of
justice and how it would work in an ideal community. With respect to this topic, I will
highlight the points of convergence that exist between Rorty' s and Plato's ways of
thinking. I will then propose several descriptions of what exactly it is that one might be
looking for when one seeks to transcend cultural differences in an attempt to promote
human solidarity, which might ultimately prove compatible with both pragmatism and
idealism.

Rorty writes, "When I say 'we should do this or that 'we cannot' do that, I am not,
of course, speaking from a neutral standpoint" (54). In fact, Rorty's conception of
philosophy makes it impossible for anyone to be a neutral thinker, even if s/he would like
to be. Rorty states, " ... there is no natural order of philosophic inquiry" (55), and "the
creation of a new form of cultural life, a new vocabulary, will have its utility explained
only retrospectively" (50). So even if we grant Rorty his notion that Plato's references to
the ideal Truth demonstrates that Plato was a metaphysician, Rorty still has to say that
Plato was:
(I) simply starting his inquiries where he saw fit, and

(2) creating a new vocabulary along the way, to be judged retrospectively.
Admittedly, Rorty and Plato's theories do differ in principle: Plato allows Truth to enter
into his account of the ideal just society, and Rorty does not. But Rorty, as a selfproclaimed non-neutral thinker, will have to allow Plato's account to be equally as viable
as his own. In other words, regardless of how Plato arrives at the ideas in the Republic,
the bottom line is that he, like Rorty, is simply putting forth yet one more metaphor that
redescribes justice and a just society. In fairness, then, Rorty can only say that
pragmatism might be superior to (but not a replacement for) metaphysical idealism, in that
it would be more likely to lead to a functional society.
So what exactly would constitute a functional society, from Rorty's point of view?
He writes:
To sum up, the citizens of my liberal utopia would be people who had a sense of
the contingency oftheir language of moral deliberation, and thus oftheir
consciences, and thus oftheir community ... people who combined commitment
with a sense ofthe contingency oftheir own commitment. (61)

And in terms of a just society, Rorty agrees with John Rawls, who says:
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What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent
and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and
our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions
embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us (58).

Rorty evidently places great stock in the pragmatism ofRawls, who, according to Rorty,
has helped to "undermine the idea of a transhistorical'absolutely valid' set of concepts
which would serve as 'philosophical foundations' of liberalism" (CIS 57). My suggestion
is that Rorty would thereby endorse Rawls' concept of the 'veil of ignorance' and,
furthermore, that Plato operates from a theoretical standpoint much like the one outlined
by Rawls (i.e. from behind a veil of ignorance) when giving his account ofthe ideal
society. Plato writes, "If we could watch a city coming to be in theory, wouldn't we also
see its justice coming to be. and its injustice as well?" (43). It is precisely this sort of
coming-to-be that Rawls proposes to observe from behind the veil of ignorance. Briefly,
this 'veil of ignorance' is a metaphorical description of a knowledge-barrier that is in effect
in a certain hypothetical situation, namely, when all rational beings have a meeting of the
minds in order to produce a non-biased theory of justice. The goal is to theoretically
develop a just society that could be presented to any rational person for consideration, and
this same person would endorse it, believing that her chances for fmding happiness in this
society were optimized, even without having the knowledge of which class she would fmd
herself in. For example, most rational beings would not be likely to favor a society in
which one individual had total authority while the rest of the citizens adhered to her every
wish and command, over a society which allowed everyone to have a say in matters of
consequence.
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Rawls suggests that one of the primary purposes of the imaginary veil is to "nullify
the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit
social and natural circumstances to their own advantage" ( 136). In a similar attempt to
avoid power struggles in his utopic society. Plato says that one important goal is "to see
that the city as a whole has the greatest happiness" (95), thereby refuting Thrasymachus,
who had argued that "justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger" (14).
Rawls goes on to describe the (imaginary) ones assessing the principles of justice as
follows:
They understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know
the basis of social organization and the laws ofhuman psychology. (137)
Since it is Plato who is assessing the principles of justice in this case, we will examine his
particular background with respect to the above description. Plato was obviously well
aware of the political ideologies of his time, given his astute observations about the
organization of the stratified societies in Greece and his familiarity with the particular
needs of each class. He was also quite attuned to the emotional tensions that could arise if
a particular sort of government were in effect, such as a tyranny or a democracy, to cite
two examples. I believe that it is safe to say that he would meet Rawls' criteria for
political savvy. Rawls then writes:
The evaluation of principles must proceed in terms ofthe general consequences of
their public recognition and universal application, it being assumed that they will
be complied with by everyone. (138)
In a similar vein, Plato asserts his belief that people gather in cities "to live as partners and
helpers" (44) because they fmd communal living to be best. The implication ofthis is that
the citizens are willing to comply with the principles of their societies, and thus we can
speculate that they would behave in a similar manner in Plato's hypothetical society.
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Moreover, according to Rawls. the individuals considering the theory of justice should
"have a secure sense of their O\\n worth so that they have no desire to abandon any of their
aims provided others have less means to further theirs" (144). Likewise, Plato writes,
"we've heard many say and have often said ourselves that justice is doing one's own work
and not meddling with what isn't one's own" ( 108), and thus we can conclude that Rawls
stipulation is actually inherent in Plato's account of justice. The main point ofthis
comparison between Rawls and Plato is to show that Plato is operating with an assumed
veil of ignorance, while still presuming (as does Rawls) that his resulting theory of a just
society would be commonly accepted. I suspect that Rorty would favor such a move. as
Plato also admits, "the true city. in my opinion. is the once we've described ... [but yet] the
things I mentioned earlier and the way of life I described won't satisfY some people" (48).
Plato does acknowledge that there is not a predetermined and universally accepted idea of
a just society. This raises the question. however. of whether or not Rawls' plan is
realistic, given that so far there has been no universal consensus on any description of an
ideal just society. What would be a reason to even speculate that there could be any social
organization that people would unanimously favor over all others? If we uphold Rawls'
assumption that the decision-makers are rational beings, and ifwe add the further
assumption that rational beings want to optimize their chances for self-preservation and
positive interactions with other rational beings, then we can safely say that there must be a
(hypothetical) society that will best promote such objectives. Basic human needs will be
'

accounted for, as well as outlets for common human desires such as love, physical fitness,
artistic ventures, finanical security, and so ort. Rawls' plan is.to simply formulate an
account of a society that will provide the greatest amount of contentment for the greatest
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come upon a belief that we fmd more suitable. The evidence for this is the central claim
in Chapter 1 of Contingency, irony and solidarity:
... what matters in the end are changes in the vocabulary rather than changes in
belief, changes in truth-value candidates rather than assignments of truth-value.
(47)
Socrates would have been willing to go along with this plan as well. When talking about
corruption of the youth (this particular topic being irrelevant to the point I am trying to
make) Socrates states: "Then. as the argument has demonstrated- and we must remain
persuaded by it until someone shows us a better one-they mustn't behave like that" (64 ). It
seems as though he is not being so dogmatic after all.
One of the most distinct parallels between Rorty's and Plato's ideal societies is that
both have as an undercurrent the notion that the avoidance of cruelty should be a common
social goal. In the Introduction to CIS. Rorty writes:
Liberal ironists are people who include among these ungroundable desires their
own hope that suffering will be diminished, that the humility ofhuman beings by
other human beings by other human beings may cease (xv).
Likewise, at the end of a discussion between Socrates and Polemarchus, Socrates asks,
" ... for ithas become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone?'' (11) and
Polemarchus affirms this conclusion. Rorty makes his case again when he later states that
we should privatize any desires for autonomy, "in order to prevent [ourselves] from
slipping into a political attitude which will lead [us] to think that there is some social goal
more important than the avoidance of cruelty" (65). Similarly, Socrates poses another
hypothetical question, asking Glaucon, "And wouldn't you think that the worst thing that
someone.could do to this city is injustice?" (109). Given Socrates' definition of injustice,
namely, meddling in another individual's affairs, renouncing human virtue, harming one's
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friends, and the like, this amounts to saying that to either directly or indirectly harm a
fellow citizen is an undesirable behavior. While Plato and Rorty do cite different
examples of cruel and/or harmful behaviors, implicit in both perspectives is that we should
strive to avoid causing unwarranted mental angst or physical pain in our fellow humans.
Another point of comparison between Rorty and Plato stems from the notion that
the youth of a society are quite impressionable in their moral conduct, and that as a result,
we should carefully consider the effects of publicly available literature. Rorty expects that
a literary critic will:
... facilitate moral reflection by suggesting revisions in the canon of moral
exemplars and advisers. and suggesting ways in which the tensions within this
canon may be eased- or, where necessary, sharpened. (82)
Plato himself takes on a similar role when he is discussing the content of stories about
gods and heroes that future guardians of the kallipolis might hear during their training.
Concerning the storytellers, Plato says, "'We'll select their stories whenever they are fine
and beautiful and reject them when they aren't" (53). After citing several examples of
passages that he fmds inappropriate, such as Wine-bibber, with the eyes of a dog and the
heart ofa deer (Achilles insulting his commander, Agamemnon) and Gifts persuade gods,
and gifts persuade revered kings (source unknown), Plato concludes:
... these stories are harmful to people who hear them, for everyone will be ready to
excuse himself when he's bad, ifhe is persuaded that similar things both are being
done now and have been done in the past. (68)
Admittedly, Plato's promotion of radical censorship is more drastic than Rorty's
suggestion that we merely revise the canon (not to the neglect of all other texts, which I
take to be the_ primary difference), but both seem to believe that we should focus our
attention on authors and critics who strive to sensitize readers to misconduct.
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Rorty believes that Wilfrid Sellars' concept of'we-intentions' is a good starting
point for moral reflection. In Science and Metaphysics, Sellars writes:
It is a conceptual fact that people constitute a community, a we, by virtue of
thinking of each other as one of us. and by willing the common good not under the
species ofbenevolence- but by willing it as one of us. or from a moral point of
view. (190)

The ancientGreeks shared this kind of"we" and "they" mentality. as evidenced by a
passage in the Republic wherein Socrates and Glaucon are discussing the nationalistic
attitudes of their people. Socrates declares, "I say that· the Greek race is its own and akin.
while the barbarians are strange and foreign" (145). As an offshoot to this kind mentality,
Rorty says, "I want to deny that 'one of us human beings' can have the same force as ['our
sort of people'. 'a comrade in the movement', 'a fellow Catholic', etc.]" (190). Rorty wants
us to think of solidarity as "the ability to see more and more traditional differences (of
tribe, religion, customs, and the like) as unimportant when compared with similarities with
respect to pain and humiliation ... " ( 192). In a like manner, Socrates says, "the having of
pains andpleasures in common is the greatest good for a city" (138) because such mutual
feelings will bind the citizens together. Furthermore, Socrates speculates that the city he
is founding will be full of good and civilized Greek citizens, who will treat foreigners as
they treat each other. He says of the Greeks-to-be, "then they'll moderate their foes in a
friendly spirit" (146) and "their attitude of mind should be that of people who'll one day be
reconciled and who won't always be at war" (145). Neither Plato nor Rorty are naive
enough to think that wars will not happen, but they share the attitude that (idealistically) it
would be preferable to be tolerant of cultural differences and to live in a harmonious
society.
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The question is, then, how do we reconcile our tendency to think "we-mindedly"
with our (Rorty-inspired) goal of transcending cultural differences? Perhaps we need to
look for a larger '"we" than one that is primarily social or historical. What is it exactly that
Rorty would be looking for, should he try to uncover what we have in common with other
human beings? To recall, he suggests that what is important are our similarities with
respect to pain and humiliation. This hints at a search for similarities that are biological
and psychological in kind, as opposed to social or historical. In keeping with the idea that
humans share certain biological and psychological states. we can now introduce Plato's
notion of the tripartite soul, which he believes is common to all individuals. Each of the
parts. namely, the rational part, the non-rational appetitive part. and the spirited part,
correspond with distinct features ofthe kallipolis, namely. the rulers, the producers, and
the guardians. respectively. In order for a human being to function well. just as for a city
to function well, each of the three parts must be in harmony with the other two.
Accordingly, this leads us to the description of a just person. much in the same way that
Plato arrives at the concept of a just city. Plato states:
One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part
or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other. He regulates
well what is really his own and rules himself. (119)
There are two things to be gleaned from this account. First, it seems as though we have
highlighted Plato's elucidation ofthe concept of justice that is most congruent with a
"deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations". Second, Plato has put forth a
description of what he believes to be inherent in all human beings, which may, in fact, be
just the tip of the iceberg with respect to what we have in common with other humans.
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Rorty writes, "solidarity is not thought of as recognition of a core self, the human
essence, in all human beirigs'· ( 192). Rather, he says that the right way to construe the
slogan 'We have obligations to human beings simply as such' is to say that it urges us "to

create a more expansive sense of solidarity than we presently have" (196) by trying to
notice our similarities with people whom we currently think of as "they" rather than "us".
If we are going to take seriously Rorty's plea for us to overlook cultural differences in our
attempt to promote human solidarity, then it will be beneficial to delineate a set of
biological and psychological human characteristics that seem to transcend political, social,
cultural, and historical boundaries. Rorty would likely approve ofthe suggestion that
there is not one fmite set of characteristics that is inherent in any and every person, but
that instead. there is an infinite set of possible characteristics, certain of which are
manifested in humans more commonly than the rest. And if we can divulge the particular
characteristics that do appear most often, then we will have a clear idea of what we will
most likely discover in our quest for human solidarity.
Since Plato's time, there have been many and varied attempts to answer the
question, What is it to be human?. Perhaps the best that we can do to answer this query is
to approach it with a firm conviction that "human nature" is characterized by a vast
number of what Wittgenstein calls "family resemblances", as he describes them in

Philosophical Investigations. When considering all of the actual human natures that exist
in the world (i.e. one "per human), Wittgenstein would say that "if you look at them you
will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole
series ofthem at that" (PI 66). Thus, instead of attempting to describe the essence of
human nature, as Plato would have us do, we should acknowledge that there is no single
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trait that is common to all humans, and then we are at liberty to discuss ·human nature' in
terms ofwhat characteristics are found in most people. Accordingly, it is not my intention
to determine whether the philosophers cited in the remainder of this paper are correct or
incorrect in their analyses of human nature, but rather I will assess their ideas by
considering the extent to which the characteristics that they cite are manifested in the
human species.
Aristotle suggests that humans are distinguished from animals by the power of
reason, which is what makes civilization possible. Hence. what we find in cities are
citizens who gladly submit to the rule of the law, all aiming for a common good (although
the conception of this good may vary from city to city). Accordingly, he says that we
form communities larger than families or small villages in order to provide "the basic
necessities oflife and the contex1 in which a good life can exist" (Trigg 32). What might
be gleaned from this in relation to human solidarity is that the drive for a global
community that is such a force in contemporary societies is simply an extension of our
dependency on others for our own flourishing. In this context, Rorty's push for human
solidarity is very much in tune with current thought, which is often international in scope,
as we recognize that not onJy are we dependent on our own states and nations for the
resources that we need, but also on the rest of the world. Although it is quite possible for
an individual to survive independent from organized society, it is much more common for
humans to gather together in villages, cities, and nation states in order to promote survival.
Thomas Hobbes appeals to everyday experience to confirm his central claim about
human behavior, "which is, quite simply, that we are all selfish, and willing to take
advantage of others for our own gain" (Trigg 59). By the same token, he suggests that this
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selfishness results from our drive for self-preservation, which is not to be judged under
any code of morality, as it is simply 'the natural condition ofmankind' to be in
competition for personal security. While it might seem. at first glance. that this
characteristic would be an impediment to the creation of human solidarity, our awareness
of it allows us to pinpoint good targets for social reform. In other words, ifwe understand
that most people are self-interested above all else, then we know to approach them in
order to promote our human solidarity cause. For example. one might work for a human
rights organization under the pretense that if it makes people feel secure to know that they
will have food, clothing, and shelter, then such provisions might eliminate part oftheir
perceived need to be in a perpetual state of competition. In tum, this would seem to bring
about more cooperative neighborhoods, towns. cities, nations. and so on. in keeping with
the goal of solidarity.
David Hume is also largely preoccupied with the idea ofwhat constitutes human
nature. Hume stresses the role played by instinct in the lives of all human beings. He
believed that "our preferences are fixed, and cannot be influenced by reason, or indeed by
social pressure" (Trigg 76). A brief sketch of common human instincts might include
hunger, sexual desire, the inclination to bear children, and self-preservation. Our
recognition of the fundamental human drives allows us to assess various social situations
in the world to judge whether or not they promote human flourishing. For example, when
we hear that a poverty-stricken country such as Honduras has been demolished by a
hurricane, we know exactly what to do in order to ensure that the citizens of Honduras
have their basic human needs fulfilled. Large-scale relief efforts are likely a manifestation
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of the fact that most of us have a sense of human solidarity that is sometimes based on
personal instinctual experiences.
Freud's view ofhuman nature is largely realized through his emphasis on sexuality
as a motive for human action. as sexual motives are "the most potent forces in human life"
(Trigg 139). He suggests that desire, and sexual desire in particular, is responsible for
conflict within each individual. The way to keep desire in check, of course, is through the
ego, or ·reason and common sense', which serves as the mediator between the super-ego
and the id. Freud's tripartite division ofthe human personality is comparable to Plato's
division ofthe soul into the rationaL spirited, and appetitive parts. If accepted, Freud's
analysis would serve to explain many of the sentiments that we find in our fellow humans.
For example. feelings of moral guilt arise as the super-ego, representing the claims of
morality, comes into conflict with the ego. Anxiety comes about as the ego has to admit
its weakness in the face of its '"three tyrannical masters, the external world, the super-ego,
and the id" (Trigg 142). Ultimately, Freud agrees with Hume that "Reason can control,
but never fmally dominate, our passions" (Trigg 143). In so far as this relates to human
solidarity, our search for commonality might be influenced by the recognition that humans
are instinctual creatures, at least in part. We will likely meet other human beings who
experience difficulties in coming to terms with their sexuality, or with their fear of death,
or with the tension between outside moral forces, such as the church or the state, and their
own 'lower' passions. Such an understanding of the most common psychological states
will give us a common bond when we encounter another human being for the first time, as
we will be able to immediately assign probable causes (in terms of inner turmoil) oftheir
preoccupations and/or neuroses.
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Wittgenstein proposes that the main characteristic of humans is the use of
language. We can usually trace an individual's language acquisition back to his or her
society, so given that (on one interpretation of Wittgenstein) "Our humanity is both
expressed in, and created by, language" (Trigg 139) it may be concluded that society
ultimately determines what it is to be human. So, one way to create solidarity using
language as the means is to encourage an individual to study the languages of cultures
outside ofthe one(s) in which s/he lived during his or her developmental years. Any
linguist will likely confirm that there is much to be learned by studying the language of
another people. including their social priorities. gender relations, class divisions. and so
on. Initially, we do not often have a spoken tongue in common with residents of different
nations, but once we create the bridge, it allows for a great many discoveries about exactly
what it is that our peoples have in common.
In his essay "Freedom and Resentment", P.F. Strawson says that most of us attach
very great importance to the attitudes and intentions towards us of other human beings,
particularly those human beings with whom we have formed special relationships. In
response to their "goodwill, affection, or esteem ... or their contempt, indifference, or
malevolence ... " (5), we form reactive attitudes and feelings, such as gratitude and
resentment, in accordance with whichever of the aforementioned attitudes we perceive. It
seems as though we are safe in saying that people expect goodwill from their family
members, colleagues, friends, and lovers, and when they do not find it, they become
resentful. In a larger sense, most people seem to expect a measure of goodwill from their
fellow man in general, and they will become hostile and resentful if they are not given
their due. As this relates to our quest for human solidarity, it seems as though we will find
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similarities among expectations in interpersonal relationships. from the very casual to the
most intimate. Thus. when we meet someone for the first time. regardless of (what Rorty
might call) ''tribal differences". we can presume that if we show goodwill towards this
person. they will respond favorably, and if we are malevolent, then s/he will keep us at a
distance, in which case we have failed to promote solidarity.
With regards to human tendencies, Strawson makes another point that I find to be

in harmony with a Rortian way of thinking. He states:
Men makes for themselves pictures of ideal forms oflife ... and one and the same
individual may be captivated by different and sharply conflicting pictures at
different times. (26)
He goes on to say that such idealistic pictures may include notions such as personal honor,
contemplation. retreat, power, and ''simple human solidarity and cooperative endeavor'"
(26). The bottom line is that "'any ofthese ideas, and a great many others too, may form
the core and substance of a personal ideal'' (26 ). What might work for Rorty. in this case,
is that we are not talking about the core and substance of a human, but rather, of a human

ideal. What might urge each of us in the direction ofhuman solidarity, then, would be an
uncovering of any dimensions of our ideal pictures that we have in common with other
humans. Strawson goes on to say that "something approaching consistency, some more or
less steady balance, is usually detectable in the pattern of an individual person's decisions
and actions" (27). Were such consistency non-existent, it would be impossible to find any
common threads among different individuals and cultures, as everyone would be in a state
of perpetual change. For Rorty's plan to work, then, humans must generally be consistent
in their thoughts and behaviors. As evidenced by the law and order that supervenes on
most societies, this does seem to be the case. Our recognition of this tendency in our
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fellow humans to adhere to certain ideals is itse(f a discovery of something that we have in
common with them. in addition to the fact that quite often. we find that we have similar
goals.
There is obviously not one model of the human experience that completely
encompasses all ofthe aforementioned human tendencies. Nonetheless. it does seem as
though the philosophers cited have uncovered the tendencies that do appear most
frequently in all societies ofthe world. My main concern with Rorty's account of human
solidarity is that he gives us very little guidance in our search for this solidarity, aside
from the recognition that we all share a capacity for pain and humiliation. The "typical''
human experience obviously has many more dimensions than pain and humiliation.
Furthermore, concepts like 'humiliation' seem to speak of some sort ofhigher moral
order, in so far as there must be an accepted standard ofbehavior in order for 'humiliation'
to have any meaning in the first place.
Plato might have to concede (were he still alive) that there is no one complete and
accurate account of'human nature', given that the debate still continues about what
exactly it means to be human. Rorty, meanwhile, would have done well to provide a more
detailed account ofwhat might be formulated during the creation of human solidarity. A
compromise between our idealist and our pragmatist might be that we create solidarity as
we bring into the open the characteristics that we seem to have in common with other
humans, in an attempt to ultimately elucidate as many shared human features as possible.
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